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Abstract
The English-language literature of technological change is one of the few ar-
eas of economic writing in which Joseph Schumpeter has maintained a following
and in which he has been accorded some modicum of the attention he deserves.
There has grown up within this literature a standard interpretation of Schumpeter’s
famous assertion that progress will eventually come to be ’mechanized’. The con-
ventional wisdom goes something like this. The argument in Schumpeter’s early
writings by which writers invariably mean the 1934 English translation of The
Theory of Economic Development – is really quite different from that in Cap-
italism, Socialism, and Democracy. There are, in effect, two Schumpeters: an
’early’ Schumpeter and a ’later’ Schumpeter. It was the former who believed in
the importance of bold entrepreneurs, while the latter envisaged their demise and
replacement by a bureaucratized mode of economic organization. Moreover, the
reason Schumpeter changed his views is that he was reacting to the historical de-
velopment of capitalism as he saw it taking place around him. As he moved from
the world of owner-managed firms in early twentieth-century Europe to the world
of large American corporations in the 1930s and 1940s, his opinions changed ap-
propriately. ¡P¿ The paper attempts to make two points. The first is that, as a
doctrinal matter, the ’two Schumpeters’ thesis, as it is understood in the Anglo-
American literature on technological change, is clearly wrong. Equally wrong is
the idea that the fundamentals of Schumpeter’s thought on entrepreneurship were
influenced importantly by any observation of large firms in the United States af-
ter 1931. Schumpeter’s ideas were remarkably consistent from at least 1926 (five
years before he came to the U. S.) until his death. The obsolescence thesis speaks
to a distinction between early capitalism and later capitalism, perhaps, but not to
an earlier and later Schumpeter. The second, and more important, point is that
the obsolescence thesis is wrong. It rests on a confusion – or perhaps a bait-and-
switch – between two quite different kinds of economic knowledge.
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I. 
 
From relative obscurity, the name of Joseph Schumpeter has leapt to 
prominence in recent years.  In part, this reflects the blossoming of 
entrepreneurial studies as a distinct field of research1 (Shane and Venkataraman 
2000).  Schumpeter’s famous discussion of the role of bold entrepreneurs in 
creating new combinations and redirecting the means of production into new 
channels is an important founding stone for any study of entrepreneurship.  
During the three or so decades after Schumpeter’s death in 1950, however, a 
quite different set of Schumpeterian ideas had entered public consciousness, 
largely through the popular writings of John Kenneth Galbraith (1967).  Far from 
exalting the role of individual initiative in economic change, this literature 
foretold – or even claimed to be chronicling – the demise of the entrepreneur.  
Innovation would become – or even had become – a matter of routine in the large 
bureaucratic corporation.  Perhaps astoundingly, these two seemingly 
incompatible sets of ideas do both emanate from Schumpeter. 
The Anglo-American literature of technological change is one of the few 
areas of economic writing in which Schumpeter maintained a following and in 
which he has long been accorded some modicum of the attention he deserves.  
This literature was quite naturally forced to deal with the problem of the 
obsolescence thesis and its relationship to the theory of (individual) 
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entrepreneurship.  The result has been a standard interpretation of the 
mechanization-of-progress thesis that has become an unexamined conventional 
wisdom.  It goes something like this.  The argument in Schumpeter's early 
writings is really quite different from that in his later work.  There are, in effect, 
two Schumpeters: an “early” Schumpeter and a “later” Schumpeter.  It was the 
former who believed in the importance of bold entrepreneurs, while the latter 
envisaged their demise and replacement by a new mode of economic 
organization.  Moreover, the reason Schumpeter changed his views is that he 
was reacting to the historical development of capitalism as he saw it taking place 
around him.  As he moved from the world of owner-managed firms in turn-of-
the-century Vienna to the world of large American corporations in the 1930s and 
1940s, his opinions changed appropriately.  
The paper attempts to make two points.  The first is that, as a doctrinal 
matter, the “two Schumpeters” thesis, as it is understood in the Anglo-American 
literature on technological change, is clearly wrong.  Equally wrong is the idea 
that the fundamentals of Schumpeter’s thought on entrepreneurship was 
influenced by any observation of large firms in the United States after 1931.  
Schumpeter’s ideas were remarkably consistent from at least 1928 (three years 
before he came to the U. S.) until his death.  The obsolescence thesis speaks to a 
distinction between early capitalism and later capitalism, perhaps, but not to an 
                                                                                                                                                 
1  One might also mention the more dubious recent association of Schumpeter with so-called 
 - 3 - 
earlier and later Schumpeter.  The second, and more important, point is that the 
obsolescence thesis is wrong.  It rests on a confusion – or perhaps a bait-and-
switch – between two quite different kinds of economic knowledge. 
 
 
II. 
 
The conventional-wisdom analysis of Schumpeter's obsolescence thesis is 
in part a matter of oral tradition among (mostly) English-speaking writers whose 
interest in Schumpeter traces to a concern with innovation and technical change. 
But documentation in print is far from lacking.  There are, in fact, several related 
versions of this conventional analysis.  One of the clearest and best known traces 
to Almarin Phillips (1971), who focuses primarily on Schumpeter's view of 
technological innovation.2  To Phillips, Schumpeter's early writings -- by which 
he means the 1934 English translation of The Theory of Economic Development -- 
present a very different picture of the logic of technological change in industry 
                                                                                                                                                 
endogenous growth theory, on which see Langlois (2001). 
2  In fact, Schumpeter's concept of innovation goes far beyond technological change in the 
narrow sense. He is concerned with what he calls “the carrying out of new combinations” 
interpreted broadly. “The concept,” he writes, “covers the following five cases: (1) The 
introduction of a new good -- that is one with which consumers are not yet familiar -- or of a 
new quality of a good. (2) The introduction of a new method of production, that is one not 
yet tested by experience in the branch of manufacture concerned, which need by no means 
be founded upon a discovery scientifically new, and can also exist in a new way of handling 
a commodity commercially. (3) The opening of a new market, that is a market into which the 
particular branch of manufacture of the country in question has not previously entered, 
whether or not this market has existed before. (4) The conquest of a new source of supply of 
raw materials or half-manufactured goods, again irrespective of whether this source already 
exists or whether it has first to be created. (5) The carrying out of the new organisation of 
any industry, like the creation of a monopoly position (for example through trustification) or 
the breaking up of a monopoly position.” (Schumpeter 1934, p. 66). 
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than do his later writings -- by which Phillips means Capitalism, Socialism, and 
Democracy.   
In the “early” Schumpeter -- Schumpeter I -- the innovation process might 
best be characterized as a linear one.  Christopher Freeman (1982) describes it 
this way.  Basic inventions are more or less exogenous to the economic system; 
their supply is perhaps influenced by market demand in some way, but their 
genesis lies outside the existing market structure.  Entrepreneurs seize upon 
these basic inventions and transform them into economic innovations.  The 
successful innovators reap large short-term profits, which are soon bid away by 
imitators.  The effect of the innovations is to disequilibrate and to alter the 
existing market structure -- until the process eventually settles down in wait for 
the next wave of innovation.  The result is a punctuated pattern of economic 
development that is perceived as a series of business cycles.  “The main 
differences between Schumpeter II and Schumpeter I,” says Freeman, “are in the 
incorporation of endogenous scientific and technical activities conducted by large 
firms. ... Schumpeter now sees inventive activities as increasingly under the 
control of large firms and reinforcing their competitive position.  The ‘coupling’ 
between science, technology, innovative investment and the market, once loose 
and subject to long time delays, is now much more intimate and continuous.” 
(Freeman 1982, p. 214, emphasis original.)  
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There is no doubt that Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy was far more 
concerned with the large corporation than was The Theory of Economic 
Development.  Furthermore, it may even be that the former contains a more 
developed “model” of the process of technological change in industry than does 
the latter.  But saying this still leaves us with at least two distinct interpretations 
of the early/late thesis.  The weaker interpretation would be that, although 
Schumpeter's theory of innovation and development remained essentially the 
same in his later as in his earlier work, the “later” Schumpeter simply chose, for 
various reasons, to elaborate more fully on the nature of the large corporation 
and its role in his theory.  And this weak form may well be what some writers 
have in mind.  But it also seems quite clear that a good many other writers have a 
far stronger version of the early/late thesis in mind.  The change from the “early” 
to the “later” Schumpeter reflects not a mere shift in his emphasis but a 
fundamental alteration of his underlying economic vision.  
A principal manifestation of this change is held to be Schumpeter's 
revised assessment of the role of -- and of the necessity for -- market competition 
in the process of innovation.  Richard Nelson's discussion is representative.  
The early Schumpeter certainly did not view the economic problem 
as that of the control of clerks.  His belief was that not only 
preferences and resources, but also technologies, change over time. 
Schumpeter, and Marx before him, saw the real power of a 
capitalist market system in terms of the ability of that system to 
spur innovation.  He also believed that competitive markets 
provided an environment (monitored by final consumers and 
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powered by competition) that controls the processes of 
technological change and spreads benefits widely. In his later 
writings, he recanted the proposition that market competition was 
necessary for the generation of innovation, positing that in large 
corporate enterprises, innovation itself has become largely 
routinized.  Therefore, he foresaw no particular disadvantages from 
socialization of the innovation process, as well as the more routine 
activities of the economy. (Nelson 1977, pp. 134-135.) 
Moreover, Schumpeter's “recantation” of his earlier position is sometimes traced 
to or associated with a fundamental shift in philosophical orientation. “As it 
happens,” writes Burton Klein, “Schumpeter expressed very different views in 
his later writings than in his earlier works, so much so that one has the 
impression there were two Schumpeters: Schumpeter the revolter against 
determinism, and Schumpeter the determinist.” (Klein 1977, p. 133.)  
A corollary to this conventional-wisdom interpretation is the notion that 
Schumpeter “changed his mind” because of what he saw developing in the 
contemporary economy.  As Freeman puts it, the “shift of emphasis from the 
early Schumpeter ... to the late Schumpeter ... reflected the real change which had 
taken place in the American economy between the two World Wars and the 
rapid growth of industrial R&D in large corporations during that period” 
(Freeman 1982, p. 8).  This is certainly not an implausible interpretation. 
Schumpeter did believe that economic history influences economic theory -- not 
in a historicist sense, but in the sense that some essential theoretical features are 
always outlined more sharply at some periods than at others. “Personally,” he 
wrote, “I believe that there is an incessant give and take between historical and 
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theoretical analysis and that, though for the investigation of individual questions 
it may be necessary to sail for a time on one tack only, yet on principle the two 
should never lose sight of each other.” (Schumpeter 1951, p. 259.)  
Ultimately, however, this conventional interpretation -- that Schumpeter 
changed his fundamental position on the nature of innovation, and that he did so 
because of trends he saw developing in twentieth-century American capitalism -- 
is, I'm afraid, clearly wrong.   
First of all, one can find examples from Schumpeter's work written after 
1942 that present very much the same theory of entrepreneurship as does The 
Theory of Economic Development. (Schumpeter 1947, 1951).  More significantly, the 
idea that the entrepreneur will eventually become “less important” or “obsolete” 
is already present in the 1934 translation of The Theory of Economic Development.  
The historical trend in favor of large firms that is theme of Capitalism, Socialism, 
and Democracy also turns up in the earlier book. 
And if the competitive economy is broken up by the growth of the 
great combines, as is increasingly the case today in all countries, 
then this must become more and more true of real life, and the 
carrying out of new combinations must become in ever greater 
measure the internal concern of one and the same economic body. 
The difference made is great enough to serve as the water-shed 
between two epochs in the social history of capitalism. (Schumpeter 
1934, p. 67.) 
The contrast -- or, rather, lack of contrast – between the English version of The 
Theory of Economic Development and Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy can 
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perhaps best be seen in the juxtaposition of the following passages. The first is 
from the “later” Schumpeter.  
This social function [entrepreneurship] is already losing 
importance and is bound to lose it at an accelerating rate in the 
future even if the economic process itself of which 
entrepreneurship was the prime mover went on unabated. For, on 
the one hand, it is much easier now than it has been in the past to 
do things that lie outside the familiar routine -- innovation itself is 
being reduced to routine. Technological progress is increasingly 
becoming the business of teams of trained specialists who turn out 
what is required and make it work in predictable ways. The 
romance of earlier commercial adventure is rapidly wearing away, 
because so many things can be strictly calculated that had of old to be 
visualized in a flash of genius. (Schumpeter 1942, p. 132, emphasis 
added.) 
Schumpeter quickly goes on (p. 133) to liken the changes he foresees in the 
entrepreneur's role with those that have already taken place in the function of 
military commander. Now consider the following passage from the “early” 
Schumpeter.  
The more accurately, however, we learn to know the natural and 
social world, the more perfect our control of facts becomes; and the 
greater the extent, with time and progressive rationalisation, within 
which things can be simply calculated, and indeed quickly and 
reliably calculated, the more the significance of this function 
decreases. Therefore the importance of the entrepreneurial type 
must diminish just as the importance of the military commander 
has already diminished. (Schumpeter 1934, p. 85, emphasis added.) 
These passages are important, and I shall return to them presently.  
In their translation of Schumpeter’s 1928 essay “Entrepreneur,” Becker 
and Knudsen (in this volume) show clearly that Schumpeter’s mature theory of 
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entrepreneurship was already in place by 1926, when he revised the first German 
edition of Theory of Economic Development.  That 1926 edition formed the basis of 
the 1934 English translation, which, as I have shown, is fully consistent with the 
obsolescence thesis in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy.  This immediately 
puts to rest the notion — which has never been based on any textual evidence 
anyway, as far as I can tell — that Schumpeter was somehow influenced by his 
observations of large American corporations in the 1930s.  Becker and Knudsen 
see a real change in Schumpeter’s theory of entrepreneurship between 1912 and 
1926.3  Rather than conceptualizing entrepreneurship as a psychological 
characteristic of a subset of the population, he came to portray entrepreneurship 
in a “depersonalized” way as an ideal type.4  In the post-1926 theory, 
entrepreneurship needn’t fill the vessel of any actual person; it reflects instead a 
category of action into which individuals (organizations?) may fall at various 
times and places.  To Becker and Knudsen, this change enables the obsolescence 
thesis, since it makes the entrepreneur less “pushy” and therefore permits an 
easy movement to an institutionalized version of entrepreneurship.  As they put 
                                                 
3  But even in the 1912 original, Schumpeter toyed with the idea that the state could take over 
the entrepreneurial role.  (See especially Schumpeter 1912, pp. 173ff.  Thanks to Wolfgang 
Gick for help with the German.)  A more detailed study might well discover that the 
continuity really goes back to 1912 or earlier, not merely to 1926. 
4  Becker and Knudsen attempt to explain Schumpeter’s new stance on entrepreneurship in 
terms of events and tragedies in his personal life.  I find far more compelling the possibility, 
which Becker and Knudsen discount, that, always ambitious and sensitive to intellectual 
fashion, Schumpeter was simply reflecting the widespread popularity of Max Weber’s 
approach in the German-speaking world of the 20s, an approach that had pushed into the 
background the older traditions of Austrian economics and the German Historical School 
that had influenced the 1912 edition. 
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it, the entrepreneur has become a carrier of change rather than a cause of change.  
However one interprets this transition from the “old” Schumpeter to the “new,” 
however, it is not the transition that writers in the Anglo-American literature of 
technological change think they see.  That one never happened. 
 
III. 
Why then are so many writers inclined to see “two Schumpeters”?  The 
simple answer is that Schumpeter has the distinction of being the principal 
source for the notion that entrepreneurship (a word that is shorthand for a 
complex set of theoretical ideas) is crucial to the economic process and -- at the 
same time -- the principal source for precisely the opposite conception: that 
entrepreneurship is no longer (or will soon no longer be) of any consequence 
whatever for the economic process, having been replaced entirely by rational 
calculation.  There are two identifiable strands of thought in Schumpeter; they 
are self-consistent, but they cannot be reconciled with one another.  Reading him 
is thus a kind of litmus test: picking out one of the strand leads in one direction; 
picking out the other leads in precisely the opposite direction.  Schumpeter I 
gives you such neo-Schumpeterian writers as Nelson and Winter (1982) and 
Klein (1977).  Schumpeter II gives you John Kenneth Galbraith.  
But if, as I've argued, this coexistence does not reflect a change of opinion, 
then what is the source of Schumpeter's litmus effect?  The answer, I believe, is 
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that the “Schumpeterian tension” arises from the unreconciled coexistence in his 
writings of two incompatible epistemic theories, to use the suggestive term of 
G. L. S. Shackle (1972) -- two inconsistent views of the role of knowledge and 
ignorance in the economic process.  
Perhaps the best way to explicate this claim is to recast it in terms of 
another -- closely related -- tension in Schumpeter. It is well known that 
Schumpeter was a great admirer of Walras. “[S]o far as pure theory is 
concerned,” he wrote in his History of Economic Analysis, “Walras is in my 
opinion the greatest of all economists.” He goes on to suggest that Walras's work 
“will stand comparison with the achievements of theoretical physics” 
(Schumpeter 1954, p. 827). Yet, while his professed scientific attitude and 
aesthetic sensibilities may have been Walrasian, his own theory is in substance 
very un-Walrasian.  Indeed, many have portrayed Schumpeter -- with a good deal 
of justification -- as representing a theoretical perspective and tradition 
alternative and antagonistic to the Walrasian approach that, by all accounts, 
dominates modern economic thought. (Nelson and Winter 1982, pp. 39-40).  
More precisely, one might say that Schumpeter's theory is in substance Mengerian 
rather than Walrasian.  
There are really only two attitudes with which to approach economic 
doctrine.  One can take the position that, beneath the inevitably discordant 
pronouncements of the various theorists with whom one is concerned, there lies 
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an essential unity; the differences are unimportant, merely epiphenomenal to 
that underlying unity.  Or one can take the position that it is the differences that 
are essential, that whatever superficial similarities may appear among theories 
are in fact merely a cover for fundamentally divergent views.  Schumpeter 
adopted the former attitude, at least so far as the marginalist revolution -- and 
indeed the economics of his own day -- was concerned. “Nobody denies that, 
numerous differences in detail notwithstanding, Jevons, Menger, and Walras 
taught essentially the same doctrine”5  (Schumpeter 1954, p. 952).  
However true such an assertion might have been in 1950, it is clear that, in 
the last few decades at least, quite a number of historians of thought have begun 
to deny just that.  The marginalist revolutionaries have been “dehomogenized” 
(to use Jaffé's (1976) expression), a development that may say as much about the 
status of present-day economics as it does about that of the 1870s.  And most of 
the dehomogenizers wish to enlist the syncretist and Walras-admiring -- but also 
Austrian -- Schumpeter into the dissident Mengerian camp.  “It is just because he 
admired Walras so much,” writes Erich Streissler, “that Schumpeter is such a bad 
guide to the real Austrian achievement, which has always been in complete 
contrast to Walras” (Streissler 1972, p. 430n).  One might also say that 
                                                 
5  Regarding Schumpeter's attitude toward the unity of economic thought in his own day, see 
Schumpeter (1982).  In an article written not long after Schumpeter's death, Fritz Machlup 
defended this syncretism -- «a conciliatoriness which could be misjudged as weak 
eclecticism» -- as a form of methodological tolerance or methodological pluralism. (Machlup 
1951, p. 146.) 
 - 13 - 
Schumpeter's admiration for Walras also served to mask the distinctly non-
Walrasian character of his own achievement.  
There are a number of ways in which Schumpeter's work displays 
affinities to that of Menger.  In one important sense, both were more in the 
classical than the neoclassical tradition.6  Like Adam Smith, they were concerned 
with the problem of economic development -- of the creation of wealth -- rather 
than with questions of the simple allocation of resources. “It is in the true 
tradition of Menger that Schumpeter's treatment of technical progress is so much 
more inclusive than the Marxian or modern neoclassical treatment” (Streissler 
1972, p. 431).  Other similarities between Schumpeter and Menger would include 
an emphasis on disequilibrium processes; a concept of competition very unlike 
the Walrasian “perfect competition” construct; and a concern with social 
institutions.7  For present purposes, though, the most important way in which 
Schumpeter's theory is Mengerian (or at least non-Walrasian) is in its attitude 
toward economic knowledge and learning.  
Having appropriated Shackle's term “epistemic,” let me now turn it to my 
own uses. There are, it seems to me, two fundamental categories of epistemic 
theories -- that is, two categories of theories about the way economic agents 
                                                 
6  “Schumpeter is much closer intellectually to Marshall and Smith than he is to Samuelson 
and Arrow.” (Nelson 1977, p. 136.) “Schumpeter was well within the classical tradition.” 
(Nelson and Winter 1977, p. 64.) 
7  Streissler (1972, passim); Jaffé (1976, passim); and Kirzner (1979, esp. p. 3). But see also Kirzner 
(1979, pp. 53-75). 
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know and learn.8  One category is that of rationalist theories.  Broadly speaking, 
such theories portray the rationality of economic agents as consisting entirely in 
logical deduction from explicit premises.  In ordinary neoclassical models -- 
which clearly fall into this category -- the agent faces a problem of maximization 
(or minimization).  The agent is rational when he or she solves that problem 
correctly.  The data of the problem -- what the agent “knows” -- is always given, 
and any learning that takes place is also a matter of logical processing (e. g., 
Bayesian updating) of given data.  
The other category is that of empiricist theories.  In an empiricist theory, 
the criterion of rationality is less demanding, typically requiring only reasonable 
behavior in light of the situation the agent faces, not behavior reflecting the 
substantively correct solution to an explicit (and sometimes quite complicated) 
problem.  More importantly, the nature and source of the agent's knowledge is 
empirical in character; it is gained from experience rather than deduced. As a 
result, the agent's knowledge is frequently tacit (Polanyi 1958) or contained 
inexplicitly in various habits, conventions, and institutions.  
In his discussion of the role and important of entrepreneurship, 
Schumpeter places himself squarely in the empiricist camp.  “The assumption 
that conduct is prompt and rational,” he says, “is in all cases a fiction. But it 
                                                 
8  I have developed these ideas at some length elsewhere, especially in Langlois (1985) and 
Langlois (1986). See also Boland (1982) and Littlechild (1986). 
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proves to be sufficiently near to reality, if things have time to hammer logic into 
men. ... But this holds good only where precedents without number have formed 
conduct through decades and, in fundamentals, through hundreds of thousands 
of years, and have eliminated unadapted behavior” (Schumpeter 1934, p. 80). 
This is a conception of behavior as fundamentally rule-governed.9  For 
Schumpeter, rationality as conscious calculation exists only within a small sphere 
carved out from and defined by the larger mass of the agent's inexplicit 
knowledge.  Within this sphere, “we can depend upon it that the peasant sells his 
calf just as cunningly and egotistically as the stock exchange member his 
portfolio of shares” (Schumpeter 1934, p. 80). 
The other important aspect of an empiricist epistemic theory of the sort 
Schumpeter adheres to in these passages is the inherently open-ended or 
evolutionary character of economic knowledge it implies.  Since economic 
knowledge is not a matter of logical deduction from givens, that knowledge is 
potentially unbounded.  There is always new knowledge that is not yet not 
within the agent's “calculative sphere” or means/ends framework.  Indeed, the 
job of the entrepreneur is precisely to introduce new knowledge.10  The “Circular 
Flow of Economic Life” is a state in which knowledge is not changing.  Economic 
                                                 
9  See especially Schumpeter (1934, p. 83). 
10  As Schumpeter repeatedly stressed, the knowledge with which he was concerned is new 
from the economic point of view -- not necessarily from the scientific or technical point of 
view. For him, an idea becomes an innovation when it is tried out in practice for the first 
time -- again emphasizing the empirical character of the conception. 
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growth occurs at the hands of entrepreneurs, who bring into the system 
knowledge that is qualitatively new -- knowledge not contained in the existing 
economic configuration.  
This novelty is what distinguishes the entrepreneurial function from that 
of manager or the capitalist.  This is why one is an entrepreneur only while 
carrying out new combinations, not once the business is well established.  To 
Schumpeter, “the distinctive element is readily recognized so soon as we make 
clear to ourselves what it means to act outside the pale of routine.  The 
distinction between adaptive and creative response to given conditions may or 
may not be felicitous, but it conveys an essential point; it conveys an essential 
difference.” (Schumpeter 1951, p. 253.)  
The crucial point for my argument is that a conception of 
entrepreneurship (or something very much like it) is essential for any theory that 
proposes to deal with innovation and economic growth.11  Conventional 
neoclassical models tell stories about the adjustment of known means to given 
ends, but they say very little about how those means and ends change or come 
into being in the first place.  Schumpeter would seem to agree strongly that a 
concept of entrepreneurship is a theoretical necessity.  In a vibrant passage, he 
                                                 
11  Indeed, from the point of view of internal logical consistency, the issues Schumpeter raises 
are fundamentally troubling ones for neoclassical theory.  If rationality is defined as 
optimally adjusting means to ends, then the act of choosing the framework of means and ends in 
the first place can never ultimately be a rational one.  (Winter 1964, pp. 262-4; Kirzner 1982, 
pp. 143-5; Elster 1983, pp. 74-5; Langlois 1986, p. 227 and passim.) 
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describes the epistemic role of the entrepreneur (if I may put it that way) in a 
manner that emphasizes the empirical nature of his conception.  
What has been done already has the sharp-edged reality of all 
things which we have seen and experienced; the new is only the 
figment of our imagination. Carrying out a new plan and acting 
according to a customary one are things as different as making a 
road and walking along it.  
How different a thing this is becomes clearer if one bears in mind 
the impossibility of surveying exhaustively all the effects and 
counter-effects of the projected enterprise. Even as many of them as 
could in theory be ascertained if one had unlimited time and means 
must practically remain in the dark. As military action must be 
taken in a given strategic position even if all the data potentially 
procurable are not available, so also in economic life action must be 
taken without working out all the details of what must be done. 
Here the success of everything depends on intuition, the capacity of 
seeing things in a way which afterwards proves to be true, even 
though it cannot be established at the moment, and of grasping the 
essential fact, discarding the unessential, even though one can give 
no account of the principles by which this is done. Thorough 
preparatory work, and special knowledge, breadth of intellectual 
understanding, talent for logical analysis, may under certain 
circumstances be sources of failure. (Schumpeter 1934, p. 85.) 
Entrepreneurship -- introducing the qualitatively new -- is an activity inherently 
different, it would seem, from the kind of rational calculation portrayed in the 
imagery of neoclassical modeling.  
It is interesting that Schumpeter regards the entrepreneurial act as 
requiring in fact greater conscious rationality than routine activity. (Schumpeter 
1934, p. 85.)  This reemphasizes the empirical nature of his conception of 
economic knowledge.  Routine behavior requires less conscious rationality 
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because it is essentially “preprogrammed” through trial-and-error learning. 
Notice, of course, that the conscious rationality of the entrepreneur is not adequate 
-- in “early” capitalism, at any rate -- to the task of innovation.  This is why 
entrepreneurship requires intuition, the leap of logic.  
But -- and here we get to the heart of the matter -- conscious rationality, 
for Schumpeter, is in fact becoming increasingly adequate to the job of dealing 
with the radically new.  
The more accurately, however, we learn to know the natural and 
social world, the more perfect our control of facts becomes; and the 
greater the extent, with time and progressive rationalisation, within 
which things can be simply calculated, and indeed quickly and 
reliably calculated, the more the significance of this 
[entrepreneurial] function decreases. Therefore the importance of the 
entrepreneurial type must diminish just as the importance of the 
military commander has already diminished. (Schumpeter 1934, p. 
85, emphasis added.) 
Notice the syllogism.  Because the unknown can be increasingly calculated 
rationally, the “extra-logical” function of the entrepreneur becomes increasingly 
unnecessary, and so the importance of the entrepreneurial type must diminish.  
What this amounts to is a strange commingling of an empiricist and a 
rationalist theory of economic knowledge.  In “early” capitalism (not the “early 
Schumpeter”) economic rationality derived largely from evolved habit and 
convention; attempts to step outside this configuration of knowledge could not 
be accomplished by conscious rationality and explicit calculation.  Rationality 
was “bounded,” in effect.  In “later” capitalism (not the “later Schumpeter”) the 
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bounds of rationality are being broken.  Conscious rationality is beginning to 
conquer not merely the entrenched conventions of the past but also the 
previously unknowable future.  
Perhaps the analogy with a more recent writer will make this clearer. 
Schumpeter's epistemic theory (if I may use that high-blown phrase again) is 
ultimately very close to that of Herbert Simon (Langlois 1990, 2003).  Simon is, of 
course, the author of the expression “bounded rationality.” The basic idea is that 
human information-processing capacity is limited, making conscious rationality 
of the neoclassical variety quite impossible.  The agent must therefore “satisfice” 
and rely on heuristic approximations.  What is typically overlooked in Simon's 
conception, however, is that it is at base a strongly rationalist theory of 
knowledge.  For Simon, one is rational only when one has reached the 
substantively correct solution of the explicit choice problem one faces.  His 
preferred imagery includes chess games and complex differential equations, 
problems that do in fact have substantively correct solutions, even if they are 
solutions to which we can at present only aspire.  His innovation, in short, is to 
suggest that one may only approximate true rationality; he does not ultimately 
call the notion itself into question. Moreover, Simon like Schumpeter is 
convinced that improvements in computational and management technique will 
provide closer and closer approximations to true rationality and may even 
unbound rationality in some spheres. 
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IV. 
What, then, are we to make of the “Schumpeterian tension”? I contend 
that it has strong implications for Schumpeter's assessment of the workability of 
socialism and the eventual demise of capitalism.  
Schumpeter's argument, we saw, goes something like this. 
Entrepreneurship -- bringing the radically new into the economic system -- has 
been the province of bold individuals because, in a world of limited knowledge, 
it is necessarily an unpredictable and extra-rational activity.  Notice that this is in 
effect an argument in favor of a capitalist (or, more correctly, a liberal) social 
order.  For Schumpeter, the relative efficiency of an economic system depends 
not on how it “administers existing structures” (Schumpeter 1942, p. 84) but on 
how well it generates innovation.  Because of limited knowledge, “planning” is 
incompatible with innovation; progress depends on the ability of individuals to 
command resources and direct them in unconventional and surprising 
directions.  But the limits to knowledge are disappearing, Schumpeter believes, 
and socialism will thus eventually come to be roughly as effective as capitalism 
in generating economic growth.  
But does the argument hold water?  Does the growth of economic and 
technical knowledge in fact imply that innovation is becoming predictable and 
routine?  This is a matter of some dispute.  It is certainly true that innovation -- or 
R&D, at any rate -- is more organized today than it was in the nineteenth 
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century.  This is a manifestation of the growing division of labor, one that would 
not have surprised Adam Smith and the classicals (Langlois 2002).  But for Smith, 
the increasing division of labor did not generate innovation because it made the 
future predictable; rather, the division of labor heightened innovation because it 
increased the diversity of ideas in society.  Innovation remained a matter of 
empirical trial and error.  
We can put the issue somewhat differently. I have argued that 
Schumpeter's story of a transition from bounded to unbounded rationality 
actually implies a transition from an empiricist to a rationalist theory of 
economic knowledge. Is such a transition possible? Or does Schumpeter's 
account ultimately rest on a confusion of two logically distinct kinds of 
knowledge? Although I cannot mount the arguments here,12 there is good reason 
to think that such a confusion is indeed in operation in Schumpeter. If so, the 
mechanization-of-progress thesis loses much of its force.  
In order to see what this would mean, we need to understand the 
routinization of progress, and thus the passing of the entrepreneur, in the 
complete context of Schumpeter's sociological argument. “We have seen,” he 
says, “that, normally, the modern businessman, whether entrepreneur or mere 
managing administrator, is of the executive type.  From the logic of his position 
he acquires something of the psychology of the salaried employee working in a 
                                                 
12  But see Lavoie (1985) for a discussion of the “socialist calculation debate” along these lines. 
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bureaucratic organization” (Schumpeter 1942, p. 156). This is not an unfamiliar 
observation.  The conclusion usually drawn from it, especially by writers in the 
now well-developed tradition of Berle and Means (1932), is that it is therefore a 
matter of indifference, from a functional standpoint, whether the productive 
organization is privately or state owned; indeed, state ownership would seem 
preferable since its motives are “public” and hence purified of the taint of private 
desire.  
Schumpeter draws a much different conclusion from this observation.  To 
Schumpeter, the crucial fact about the modern corporation is that its managers 
cannot fill the strong social role played by the entrepreneur.  Entrepreneurs are 
pillars of strength, symbols of legitimacy, role models.  They provide the new 
ideas and new blood that refresh the “bourgeois stratum.”  “Economically and 
sociologically, directly and indirectly, the bourgeoisie therefore depends on the 
entrepreneur and, as a class, lives and dies with him, though a more or less 
prolonged transitional stage -- eventually a stage in which it may feel equally 
unable to die and to live -- is quite likely to occur, as in fact did occur in the case 
of the feudal civilization” (Schumpeter 1942, p. 134).  Socialism will succeed 
because, without the entrepreneur to guard it, “the bourgeois fortress ... becomes 
politically defenseless.”  It is not the managerial class who are the plunderers; it 
is a New Class of socialist intellectuals and government officials.  “Defenseless 
fortresses invite aggression, especially if there is rich booty in them.  Aggressors 
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will work themselves up into a state of rationalizing hostility -- aggressors 
always do.  No doubt it is possible, for a time, to buy them off.  But this last 
resource fails as soon as they discover that they can have it all” (Schumpeter 
1942, p. 143).  
Schumpeter is thus after bigger game than Berle and Means: nothing less 
than Marx himself.  Schumpeter has no great love for a socialist system (or, in 
particular, a socialist culture); but he does see the similarities between private and 
state bureaucracy as smoothing the way for socialism.  “Thus the modern 
corporation, although the product of the capitalist process, socializes the 
bourgeois mind; it relentlessly narrows the scope of capitalist motivations; not 
only that, it will eventually kill its roots” (Schumpeter 1942, p. 156).  Like Marx, 
then, he sees capitalism as leading to its own destruction.  But unlike Marx, 
Schumpeter sees capitalism as the victim of its own economic success not its 
economic failure.  This tale stands Marx on his head, its plot laced with a heavy 
and self-satisfied irony.  The tone is disinterested and the attitude fatalistic; but 
the message is largely cautionary.  At base, Schumpeter is nothing so much as a 
neoconservative, perhaps the first neoconservative.  
How would this story have to change if Schumpeter is wrong about the 
mechanization of progress?  On one level, the effect is significant.  An economic 
system that continues to rely on tacit, empirical knowledge -- what F. A. Hayek 
(1945) called “the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place” -- 
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would sacrifice much of its innovativeness, and thus much of its engine of 
progress, by consigning its industry and commerce to a bureaucratic socialism. 
This would certainly make the transition to socialism much more painful to the 
voting population, and thus would likely slow or modify (if not necessarily 
prevent) its advent.  Needless to say, this interpretation seems far more 
compelling now after 1989 than it did perhaps when Schumpeter was writing. 
The role of the mechanization-of-progress thesis in the larger sociological 
theory is to underscore the power of bourgeois capitalism on an economic level: 
it is so efficient that it has conquered even our ignorance of the unknown; it can 
stamp out innovation with all the efficiency that it brings to bear on stamping out 
mass-produced goods.  To deny capitalism this power over the future mars the 
aesthetic of Schumpeter's panorama somewhat, for it makes the inversion of 
Marx less perfect than otherwise, and it diminishes the fatalism that gives the 
story much of its color.  
In the end, however, taking all this too seriously puts us in danger of 
reading Schumpeter literal-mindedly.  The force of the argument is in the texture 
of the landscape -- not in its details.  Indeed, there is a sense in which the 
“Schumpeterian tension” -- the tension between the Schumpeter who comes to 
praise entrepreneurship and the Schumpeter who comes to bury it -- actually 
enriches the majestic irony of Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy.  
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